Since taking power in landslide democratic elections in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is leading Turkey in a new direction, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. This direction includes rapprochement with Iran; working more closely with the Islamist regime of Sudan despite the indictment of its president on genocide charges; supporting the Hamas movement which rules Gaza; and fostering stronger ties with Russia and China. Turkey’s leaders have distanced themselves from the United States and have deliberately worked to undermine relations with the country’s former friend and ally Israel while failing to reach a breakthrough with neighboring Armenia.
From the point of view of the U.S., this direction is detrimental to Turkey's traditional secular democracy, as well as to its close relations with the West. Washington sees AKP leadership championing a process in which Turkey is coming under the rule of a populist authoritarian regime rooted in Islamism.
Increasing Turkish frustration with the European Union’s haughtiness and the United States’ perceived indifference opened a window of opportunity for Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to begin implementing a policy described in his book “Strategic Depth.”
In his work, Davutoğlu emphasizes a “zero problems with neighbors” approach to regional foreign policy relations. Thus, Turkey's new foreign policy concept is to emerge as a regional hegemon through developing economic presence, interdependence, and a conspicuously important diplomatic role. To this end, Turkey has promoted visa-free tree travel with “Shams” – the former greater Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. It has also moved closer to Russia, China, Iran, and the neighboring Muslim states.
In December 2004, Vladimir Putin became the first Russian president to visit Turkey in 32 years. His visit precipitated increased high-level political contact with Moscow and Turkey’s relations with Russia have been improving notably since then, with Ankara and Moscow sharing business and geopolitical interests. Russia became Turkey’s largest trade partner in 2008 and there are hopes that trade could reach a volume of $100 billion over the next five years. Such a major increase in trade would be, in part, due to the $20 billion nuclear plant agreement signed by the two leaders in May 2010, to be built near Mersin on Turkey’s southern coast.
As well as economic advances, Turkey has developed a no-visa requirement treaty with the Russians. This burgeoning close relationship with Prime Minister Putin's assertive and revisionist Russia also marks the progress of Turkey's realignment away from its traditional allies. It is also forging new and closer friendships in the Middle East.
The return of the Sultan?
Turkey's relations throughout the Middle East combine elements of the old and the new: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu clearly oppose any strengthening of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. However, they have shown that they are willing to protect Islamic interests on the basis of their common faith.
Despite the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization by both the EU and the U.S., the AKP administration has opened communication with the Islamist group. In 2010, Davutoğlu met with Khaled Meshaal, the Damascus-based leader of Hamas' political wing. Prime Minister Erdoğan also defended Hamas at a Konya rally in June 2010. “I do not think that Hamas is a terrorist organization. I said the same thing to the United States...” he said. Davutoğlu’s surrogates defended Turkey’s outreach to a number of terrorist groups as part of its “zero problems with neighbors” policy.
However, this willingness to talk does not apparently apply to relations with Israel. Even after its welcomed extension of fire-fighting assistance to Israel, President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan hastened to clarify that “friendship with Israel is over” and “it is out of the question for Israel to use NATO facilities,” apparently referring to a NATO missile defense radar to be deployed in the future. As often happens, the Turkish leaders made a mistake, alleging that “Israel does not even cooperate with NATO.” In reality, NATO-Israel ties are robust, within the Mediterranean Dialogue and beyond.
Turkey's position on Israel, its former Middle Eastern ally, has shifted dramatically in the course of this geopolitical realignment. Turkey gradually abandoned its role as a neutral mediator between Israel and its Arab neighbors and has become an active supporter of Arab and Muslim causes against Israel.
The relationship disintegrated after the tragic Gaza flotilla incident. The Turkish response was overwhelming. Turkey withdrew its ambassador, announcing he would not return unless Israel apologized and paid compensation to the relatives of those killed during the infamous fight. Furthermore, when Ankara rewrote its national security threat assessment document (“the Red Book”) in 2010, it removed Iran and placed Israel on the critical threats list.
Iran: The litmus test
Above all else, however, it is Turkey's support for Iran's nuclear program that proves to Washington that Turkey's foreign policy objectives are changing. Ankara, once an important ally in helping to contain Iran, has become a friendly diplomatic ally of the Islamist dictatorship in Tehran.
Working with the Lula government in Brazil, Ankara aided and abetted Iran’s efforts to forestall U.N. sanctions in response to its long-standing nuclear defiance. Turkey and Brazil colluded with Iran to resurrect a nuclear fuel swap proposal originally hatched by the Obama Administration in the fall of 2009. Erdoğan's administration even defended his decision by suggesting that a U.S. presidential letter, addressed to Brazil's leadership, authorized them to pursue the plan despite the international call for sanctions on Iran. However, the Obama letter warned Brazil about previous Iranian perfidy in conducting nuclear talks while ignoring such important and self-evident issues as the necessity to expatriate all of the nuclear mass produced by its enrichment program, install IAEA controls, and verifiably shut down any potential military applications – including enrichment. Thus, the letter was anything but a green light for Brazil, let alone NATO ally Turkey, to pursue a separate track in dealing with Iran.
US concerns ignored
How does Turkey's foreign policy realignment impact on U.S.-Turkish relations? While Obama used the term “model relationship” to describe diplomatic engagements between the U.S. and Turkey in 2009, Erdoğan's reforms have limited the country's democracy and Turkey’s unwillingness to work with the U.S. has brought the partnership into question.
After all, the AKP government offered Russia a condominium in the Caucasus during the Russo-Georgian war, delayed U.S. aid from reaching Georgia during the same 2008 conflict, became an advocate for Iran, possibly facilitated arms transfers to al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, and ignored Obama's requests to improve relations with Israel.
It is true that Turkey has devoted resources to the war in Afghanistan and peacekeeping in the Balkans – and for that the U.S. is grateful. But such acts do represent sufficient grounds to assume that all is well in the relationship.
Turkey is facing a tough choice: if it wants to emerge as a “First World” economy and a liberal democracy, it needs to protect its interests in the West and expand ties with the United States. Such a choice would dictate both internal and foreign policy priorities, different from policies aimed at becoming a leader of the Muslim and Middle Eastern worlds.
If, instead, Turkey prefers to be a “Sultan” of the East, it will continue to emphasize the priorities that are now in place: attack Israel, develop ties with radical Islamists from Tehran to Gaza to Khartoum, and irreversibly change the nature of the country.
*Ariel Cohen is senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The full version of this article was published in the fall 2010 issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly.
From the point of view of the U.S., this direction is detrimental to Turkey's traditional secular democracy, as well as to its close relations with the West. Washington sees AKP leadership championing a process in which Turkey is coming under the rule of a populist authoritarian regime rooted in Islamism.
Increasing Turkish frustration with the European Union’s haughtiness and the United States’ perceived indifference opened a window of opportunity for Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to begin implementing a policy described in his book “Strategic Depth.”
In his work, Davutoğlu emphasizes a “zero problems with neighbors” approach to regional foreign policy relations. Thus, Turkey's new foreign policy concept is to emerge as a regional hegemon through developing economic presence, interdependence, and a conspicuously important diplomatic role. To this end, Turkey has promoted visa-free tree travel with “Shams” – the former greater Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. It has also moved closer to Russia, China, Iran, and the neighboring Muslim states.
In December 2004, Vladimir Putin became the first Russian president to visit Turkey in 32 years. His visit precipitated increased high-level political contact with Moscow and Turkey’s relations with Russia have been improving notably since then, with Ankara and Moscow sharing business and geopolitical interests. Russia became Turkey’s largest trade partner in 2008 and there are hopes that trade could reach a volume of $100 billion over the next five years. Such a major increase in trade would be, in part, due to the $20 billion nuclear plant agreement signed by the two leaders in May 2010, to be built near Mersin on Turkey’s southern coast.
As well as economic advances, Turkey has developed a no-visa requirement treaty with the Russians. This burgeoning close relationship with Prime Minister Putin's assertive and revisionist Russia also marks the progress of Turkey's realignment away from its traditional allies. It is also forging new and closer friendships in the Middle East.
The return of the Sultan?
Turkey's relations throughout the Middle East combine elements of the old and the new: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu clearly oppose any strengthening of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. However, they have shown that they are willing to protect Islamic interests on the basis of their common faith.
Despite the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization by both the EU and the U.S., the AKP administration has opened communication with the Islamist group. In 2010, Davutoğlu met with Khaled Meshaal, the Damascus-based leader of Hamas' political wing. Prime Minister Erdoğan also defended Hamas at a Konya rally in June 2010. “I do not think that Hamas is a terrorist organization. I said the same thing to the United States...” he said. Davutoğlu’s surrogates defended Turkey’s outreach to a number of terrorist groups as part of its “zero problems with neighbors” policy.
However, this willingness to talk does not apparently apply to relations with Israel. Even after its welcomed extension of fire-fighting assistance to Israel, President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan hastened to clarify that “friendship with Israel is over” and “it is out of the question for Israel to use NATO facilities,” apparently referring to a NATO missile defense radar to be deployed in the future. As often happens, the Turkish leaders made a mistake, alleging that “Israel does not even cooperate with NATO.” In reality, NATO-Israel ties are robust, within the Mediterranean Dialogue and beyond.
Turkey's position on Israel, its former Middle Eastern ally, has shifted dramatically in the course of this geopolitical realignment. Turkey gradually abandoned its role as a neutral mediator between Israel and its Arab neighbors and has become an active supporter of Arab and Muslim causes against Israel.
The relationship disintegrated after the tragic Gaza flotilla incident. The Turkish response was overwhelming. Turkey withdrew its ambassador, announcing he would not return unless Israel apologized and paid compensation to the relatives of those killed during the infamous fight. Furthermore, when Ankara rewrote its national security threat assessment document (“the Red Book”) in 2010, it removed Iran and placed Israel on the critical threats list.
Iran: The litmus test
Above all else, however, it is Turkey's support for Iran's nuclear program that proves to Washington that Turkey's foreign policy objectives are changing. Ankara, once an important ally in helping to contain Iran, has become a friendly diplomatic ally of the Islamist dictatorship in Tehran.
Working with the Lula government in Brazil, Ankara aided and abetted Iran’s efforts to forestall U.N. sanctions in response to its long-standing nuclear defiance. Turkey and Brazil colluded with Iran to resurrect a nuclear fuel swap proposal originally hatched by the Obama Administration in the fall of 2009. Erdoğan's administration even defended his decision by suggesting that a U.S. presidential letter, addressed to Brazil's leadership, authorized them to pursue the plan despite the international call for sanctions on Iran. However, the Obama letter warned Brazil about previous Iranian perfidy in conducting nuclear talks while ignoring such important and self-evident issues as the necessity to expatriate all of the nuclear mass produced by its enrichment program, install IAEA controls, and verifiably shut down any potential military applications – including enrichment. Thus, the letter was anything but a green light for Brazil, let alone NATO ally Turkey, to pursue a separate track in dealing with Iran.
US concerns ignored
How does Turkey's foreign policy realignment impact on U.S.-Turkish relations? While Obama used the term “model relationship” to describe diplomatic engagements between the U.S. and Turkey in 2009, Erdoğan's reforms have limited the country's democracy and Turkey’s unwillingness to work with the U.S. has brought the partnership into question.
After all, the AKP government offered Russia a condominium in the Caucasus during the Russo-Georgian war, delayed U.S. aid from reaching Georgia during the same 2008 conflict, became an advocate for Iran, possibly facilitated arms transfers to al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, and ignored Obama's requests to improve relations with Israel.
It is true that Turkey has devoted resources to the war in Afghanistan and peacekeeping in the Balkans – and for that the U.S. is grateful. But such acts do represent sufficient grounds to assume that all is well in the relationship.
Turkey is facing a tough choice: if it wants to emerge as a “First World” economy and a liberal democracy, it needs to protect its interests in the West and expand ties with the United States. Such a choice would dictate both internal and foreign policy priorities, different from policies aimed at becoming a leader of the Muslim and Middle Eastern worlds.
If, instead, Turkey prefers to be a “Sultan” of the East, it will continue to emphasize the priorities that are now in place: attack Israel, develop ties with radical Islamists from Tehran to Gaza to Khartoum, and irreversibly change the nature of the country.
*Ariel Cohen is senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The full version of this article was published in the fall 2010 issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly.
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